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The distinction between trusts and powers as juridical concepts remains 
clear. However, during the second half of the twentieth century, the courts 
have been required to consider those concepts in the context of funds 
established for the benefit of employees and other large groups. The result 
has been that, although it is still possible to assert the conceptual distinction 
between trust and powers, the practical significance of that distinction has 
been progressively eroded. The purpose of this article is to examine these 
developments relating to the trustlpower dichotomy, culminating in the 
recent decision in Mettoy Pension Trustees Ltd v Evans.' 
1. Primary concepts 
When one .person transfers property to another person, in the majority 
of cases, the transferor intends to make, and does make, an outright transfer 
of the property to the transferee. The transferor does not retain any interest 
in the property, nor does he purport to tell the transferee how to deal with 
the property. The transferee has the property to do with as he pleases. 
However, the present article is concerned with those cases where the 
transferor transfers the property to the transferee, or more commonly 
transferees, on terms that the transferees will deal with the property in a 
particular way -ultimately for the benefit of some other person or persons 
(the beneficiaries). The nature of the terms on which the transferees hold 
the property can vary greatly according to what may be termed the "degree 
of compulsion" imposed upon the transferees; but essentially, the terms 
will involve, sometimes alone but increasingly in combination, trusts and 
powers. 
For present purposes, a trust involves the situation where the transferor 
(the "settlor") transfers property to the transferees (the "trustees") so that 
the trustees hold the legal title to the property. However, they are under a 
duty, enforced by equity, to manage the property so as to produce benefit 
(which usually means to invest the property so as to produce income); and 
they are under the further duty to divert that benefit to other persons (the 
"beneficiaries" of the trust). The essence of the trust is the duty on the 
trustees: the trustees must carry out the trust in accordance with the terms 
imposed by the settlor. 
From the point of view of the trustees, the trust, at least in its ultimate 
form of the fixed trust, is the very antithesis of an outright transfer: the 
trustees of a fixed trust are subject to the ultimate degree of compulsion. 
The settlor has fixed the beneficial or equitable interests which the bene- 
ficiaries are to receive, or at least the means of calculating those  interest^.^ 
* This article is an expanded version of a lecture delivered at the University of Canterbury in 
Se tember 1992. 
1 [1890] 1 WLR 1587, [I9911 2 All ER513. 
2 A fixed trust is created where the settlor provides within the trust instrument itse?f a complete 
answer to the questions as to who is entitled to what, and when. For example, $100,000 on 
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The trustees have no part in determining those interests; they have no 
function other than to distribute the trust property in accordance with the 
determination of the settlor; they are being used by the settlor simply as a 
means of diverting the benefit of the property to the true tranferees, the 
benefi~iaries.~ The point is further emphasized by the nature ofthe interests 
of the beneficiaries under a fixed trust. Each beneficiary is the owner of a 
specific interest in the trust property; and collectively the beneficiaries own 
the entire trust property so that, in accordance with the so-called principle 
in Saunders v V a ~ t i e r , ~  if those beneficiaries are all adult and under no 
legal disability, they can combine together to terminate the trust and 
distribute the trust property among themselves. 
Thus, in terms of the degrees of compulsion that can be imposed on 
transferees of property, outright transfers constitute the limit at one end of 
the spectrum (because they involve no compulsion at all on the transferees) 
and fixed trusts constitute the limit at the other end of the spectrum 
(because they involve the greatest possible degree of compulsion). Be- 
tween these two extremes of the spectrum, the territory is occupied by 
powers and trust/power combinations. 
Of the primary concepts, the nature of a power remains to be considered. 
A power is an authorisation given to a person to take certain action 
affecting property in circumstances where that person is not absolutely 
entitled to that property or even where that person has no interest at all in 
that property. The concept of a power in this sense embraces a wide variety 
of administrative  power^;^ but the present discussion is concerned rather 
with the dispositive type of power, namely the power of appointment, 
which authorises the donee of the power to dispose of the settler's property 
by "appointing" it to another person or persons as benefi~iaries.~ How- 
ever, in common with the discretionary nature of all powers, the essential 
feature of a power of appointment is that the donee of the power is merely 
authorised to appoint the property to one or more of the beneficiaries 
without being under a duty to do so. 
From the point of view of the donee of a power of appointment, the only 
restriction inherent in the power itselfis that, if he decides to exercise the 
power, he must keep within the terms of the power and appoint only to 
persons within the specified class of potential beneficiaries.' From the 
point of view of the potential beneficiaries of a power of appointment, two 
propositions may be asserted, each of which follows logically from the 
essential principle that a power does not have to be exercised: first, an 
individual potential beneficiary owns nothing unless and until an appoint- 
ment is made in his favour; second (and in contrast with the position under 
a trust and with the principle in Saunders v Vautier), the potential benefi- 
trust for A for life, remainder to B" or "$100,000 on trust for my children in equal shares". 
Although in the second example the quantum of each child's interest is dependent upon the 
total number of children (since each child will receive a per capita share of the $100,000) and 
the settlor may produce more children, the settlor has fixed the means of calculating those 
interests. 
3 The trustees of a fixed trust may have some discretion but only in the context of their 
administrative duties and powers, for example in relation to the investment of the trust fund. 
4 (1841) 4 Beav 115; affirmed Cr & Ph 240, 10 LJ Ch 354. 
5 Examples are the powers of trustees in relation to delegation and investment. 
6 For example, "$100,000 to A for life, remainder to whomsoever A may appoint" (where the 
donee ofthe power also has alimited interest inthe property); "$100,000 to such o f x ' s  children 
as A may appoint" (where the donee of the power has no interest in the property). 
7 The question whether the donee of a power of appointment is subject to any other duties is 
discussed below. 
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ciaries under a power of appointment cannot combine together and claim 
the property for them~elves.~ 
Conceptually, therefore, trusts and powers are clearly distinguishable. 
Trusts are imperative: the trustees must carry out the duties or obligations 
imposed by the trust; powers are discretionary: the donee of a power may 
exercise the power, or not, as he chooses. 
2. Trustlpower combinations 
The trustlpower distinction is blurred by the fact that the terms of a trust 
may give considerable discretion to the trustees. Most importantly, trustees 
may be given a discretion to select beneficiaries from a specified class, or 
to determine the proportions in which specified beneficiaries are to take. 
This is the basis of the discretionary trust, which combines the charac- 
teristics of both trusts and powers. As in the case of a fixed trust, the trustees 
of a discretionary trust have a duty to distribute the trust property among 
the specified class of benefi~iaries;~ but, as in the case of a power of 
appointment, the trustees of a discretionary trust have a discretion to select 
which members ofthe class ofpotential beneficiaries shall actually benefit. 
However, the predominant characteristic is the trust element. The discre- 
tionary trust is in the final analysis a trust, and the trustees have an 
obligation to carry out the terms of the trust. Thus, whereas the donees of 
a power of appointment can choose not to exercise their discretion and not 
to select beneficiaries, because they have no duty to do so, the trustees 
under a discretionary trust have no such choice -they do have an obligation 
to exercise their discretion and to select beneficiaries after proper consid- 
eration. For only then have they carried out the trust.I0 
It might appear to be possible simply to add discretionary trusts at some 
appropriate point on the spectrum between powers and trusts; but the 
position is not quite so straightforward. 
(a) Burrough-type and Baden-type discretionary trusts" 
The term "discretionary trust" does not have a single or exhaustive 
meaning. First, it is used apparently interchangeably with a number of 
other terms such as "trust power", "power in the nature of a trust" and 
"power coupled with a trust". Second, each of these terms has been used, 
without any apparent consistencjl, to denote two (but it is submitted only 
two) distinct types of trustlpower combination. The difference becomes 
apparent when the courts are required to remedy the failure on the part of 
the trustees to carry out their duty to make a selection from among the class 
of potential beneficiaries. For, where the court is called upon to execute 
the trust, sometimes the court will order that the trust property be divided 
equally among all the members of the class of potential beneficiaries and 
sometimes the court will order some other division of the trust property. 
The first approach is exemplified by the case of Burrough v Philcox,I2 
where a settlor directed that certain property should be held on trust for his 
two children for life and that, in the events which happened, the survivor 
of the two children "shall have power to dispose of [the property] amongst 
8 These propositions were confirmed by the House of Lords in Vestey v IRC (No 2) [I9801 AC 1 148. 
9 Subject to the distinction between exhaustive and non-exhaustive discretionary trusts discussed 
below. 
lo See, for example, Re Locker's Settlement Trusts [I9771 1 WLR 1323, [I9781 1 All ER 216, 
discussed below. 
I I The terminology was adopted by Emery (1982) 98 LQR 55 1 
12 (1840) 5 My & Cr 72,41 ER 299. 
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[the settlor's] nephews and nieces or their children, either all to one of 
them, or to as many of them as [the] surviving child shall think proper". 
Notwithstanding the apparent terminology of powers, the court inferred a 
general intention on the part of the settlor to benefit the class of potential 
beneficiaries as a whole and held that the disposition in favour of the 
nephews and nieces created a discretionary trust;13 and that, since the 
surviving child, as trustee of that discretionary trust, had failed to carry out 
the trust, it was for the court to do so. In deciding how to execute the trust, 
the court again attached particular significance to the general intention of 
the settlor: in effect the trustee had been directed to distribute to one or 
some or all members of the class; and in default of selection by the trustee 
it was appropriate to order that the trust property be divided equally among 
all members of the class. It has been argued that the courts are likely to 
adopt this first approach to unexecuted discretionary trusts where the class 
of beneficiaries is small in number, and even more so where the class 
comprises members of the settlor's family. 
On the other hand, there are cases of unexecuted discretionary trusts 
where equal division of the trust fund would clearly be wholly inappropri- 
ate. Equal division is likely to be inappropriate in the case of a company 
benefit fund, involving a substantial number of potential beneficiaries, as 
exemplified by McPhail v Doulton (Re Baden (No ]).I4 The settlor trans- 
ferred property to trustees, to "apply the net income of the fund in making 
at their absolute discretion grants to or for the benefit of any of the officers 
and employees or ex-officers or ex-employees of the company or to any 
relatives or dependants of any such persons in such amounts at such times 
and on such conditions (if any) as they think fit". In the circumstances of 
such a discretionary trust,15 to quote the words of Lord Wilberforce:16 
As a matter of reason, to hold that aprinciple of equal division applies is certainly paradoxical. 
Equal division is surely the last thing the settlor ever intended; equal division among all may, 
probably would, produce a result beneficial to none. Why suppose that the court would lend 
itself to a whimsical execution? 
Thus, if the trustees failed to carry out their duty of selection and 
distribution, the court would normally infer an intention on the part of the 
settlor that the trustees should distribute to one or some but not all members 
of the class. Equal division of the trust property would therefore not accord 
with the settlor's intention and the court would adopt some other means to 
I 3  Where the terms of a disposition are prima facie compatible with either a discretionary trust or 
a power of appointment, the inclusion of a gift over in default of selection and distribution 
precludes the characterisation of the disposition as a discretionary trust: see, for example, Re 
Hay's Settlement Trusts [I9821 1 WLR 202, [I9811 3 All ER 786, and below n 49; but there is 
no "inflexible and artificial rule of construction" in favour of a discretionary trust where there 
is no gift over in default of selection and distribution: Re Combe [I9251 Ch 210,216. Compare 
Burrough v Philcox with Re Weekes ' Settlement [I8971 1 Ch 289. 
14 [I9711 AC 424. 
15 The first issue in the case was whether the settlor had created a discretionary trust or a power 
of appointment. In its terms, the deed in this case (rather more than in Burrough v Philcox) 
seemed to point to a discretionary trust. However, both Goff J at first instance ([I9671 1 WLR 
1457) and a majority of the Court of Appeal ([I9691 2 Ch 388) held that the provision created 
a power of appointment. Harman and Karminski LJJ based their decision expressly on the baas 
that, as the law then stood on the requirements as to certainty of objects, such a decision gave 
the settlor's scheme a chance of survival; by contrast, to have decided that the provision created 
a discretionary trust would have been to condemn the scheme to certain failure. The House of 
Lords held that the provision created a discretionary trust but proceeded to re-examine (and 
alter) the requirements as to certainty of objects: see below. 
16 [I9711 AC 424,451. 
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ensure a more appropriate distribution of the trust property that would 
accord with the settler's intention. 
(b) Exhaustive and non-exhaustive discretionary trusts 
The trustlpower distinction is further blurred by the fact that a discretionary 
trust may be "exhaustive" or "nonexhaustive". An exhaustive discretion- 
ary trust requires the trustees to distribute the whole of the income arising 
in any year (or other period): their duty to exercise their discretion can only 
be satisfied by making an exhaustive distribution. That is the traditional 
discretionary trust. However, most modern large-scale discretionary trusts 
are in fact non-exhaustive in so far as the settlor gives the trustees power 
not to distribute all ofthe income arising, where, for example, he gives them 
a power to accumulate all or part of the income for a certain period. That 
was in fact the position in McPhail v Doulton.17 This further distinction 
prompts two questions: first, wherein lies the difference between a non-ex- 
haustive discretionary trust and a power of appointment? and, second, 
assuming that there is a difference and assuming that a non-exhaustive 
discretionary trust is properly characterised as a trust, what is the precise 
duty imposed upon the trustees of a nonexhaustive discretionary trust? 
The theoretical answer to those two questions appears to be that, as with 
exhaustive discretionary trusts, so with nonexhaustive discretionary trusts 
there is a duty to exercise the discretion and that provides the point of 
distinction from powers of appointment; but that, in the case of non-ex- 
haustive discretionary trusts, the duty to exercise the discretion may be 
satisfied by apositive decision on the part of the trustees to accumulate 
rather than distribute income.18 
In practical terms, however, that answer may be less than satisfactory. 
As Lord Wilberforce commented in McPhail v Doulton:19 
It is striking how narrow and in a sense artificial is the distinction, in cases such as the present, 
between [discretionary trusts]20 and powers. It is only necessary to read the learned judgments 
in the Court of Appeal to see what to one mind may appear as a power of distribution coupled 
with a trust to dispose of the undistributed surplus, by accumulation or otherwise, may to 
another appear as a trust for distribution coupled with a power to withhold a portion and 
accumulate or otherwise dispose of it. A layman and, I suspect, also a logician would find it 
hard to understand what difference there is. 
Notwithstanding these variatigns within the discretionary trust concept, 
the interests of the potential beneficiaries under a discretionary trust are 
essentially similar. Since the trustees of a discretionary trust have a 
discretion to select some and not others to benefit from the distribution of 
the trust property, it must follow that, as in the case of a power of 
appointment, no individual member of the class has an interest in any part 
of the trust property unless and until the trustees exercise their discretion 
in his favoure21 On the other hand, the overriding duty on the part of the 
17 It is not suggested that Burrough-type and Baden- pe discretionary trusts are necessarily 
exhaustive and non-exhaustive respectively; but t 71 e desire for maximum flexibility in 
Baden-type discretionary trusts tends to be reflected in the inclusion of a power of accumulation. 
18 Some commentators have taken the view that there is no longer any analytical distinction between 
discretionary trusts andpowers: see Davies (1970) ASCL 187; Grbich (1974) 37 MLR643. Hams 
(1971) 87 LQR 31 seeks to resolve the perceived difficulties by characterising the duty of 
discretionary trustees as a rule-based duty with no necessity for correlative rights in the potential 
beneficiaries. 
19 [I9711 AC 424,448. 
20 Lord Wilberforce used the term "trust powers" throughout his speech. 
21 It was this factor that prompted the use of discretionary trusts as a potentially effective 
mechanism for the mitigation of tax liability; but changes in tax policy and legislation in the 
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trustees to execute the trust by distributing andlor accumulating the trust 
property means that the class of potential beneficiaries collectively owns 
the trust property - so that, as in the case of a fixed trust, if they are all 
adult and not under any legal disability, they may combine together to 
terminate the trust and distribute the trust property among themselves. 
However, in identifying the "class of potential beneficiaries" for these 
purposes it may be necessary to distinguish between exhaustive and 
non-exhaustive discretionary trusts: in the case of the former the class 
comprises the range of beneficiaries from whom the trustees must select;22 
in the case of the latter the class would presumably include in addition any 
beneficiaries (potentially) entitled under the accumulation provision. 
Although the conceptual distinction between trusts and powers remains, 
in practice the distinction has to a significant extent been obscured as a 
result of the modern exploitation of the large-scale discretionary trust and 
the complex combination of trusts and powers within the same trust deed. 
The legal developments discussed in this article have not take place 
exclusively in the commercial' context;23 but it has probably been the 
increased use of the trust machinery in that context that has provided the 
catalyst for those developments. In particular, there has been a growing 
tendency for employers to establish pension funds and other employee 
benefit schemes, which use the trust machinery but which confer wide 
discretionary powers of selection and distribution on the trustees.z4 
However, prior to the decision of the House of Lords in McPhail v 
Doulton, the conceptual distinction between trusts and powers continued 
to have an impact in the context of discretionary trusts and powers of 
appointment in two important respects. First, the requirements of certainty 
of objects (and thus validity) were stricter for trusts (including discretion- 
ary trusts) than for powers of appointment. Second, as indicated above, the 
consequences of the failure to execute a discretionary trust or to exercise 
a power of appointment were different: the potential beneficiaries under a 
discretionary trust were entitled to the trust property whereas the potential 
beneficiaries under a power of appointment were not. 
In McPhail v Doulton the House of Lords reviewed the requirements of 
certainty of objects in relation to discretionary trusts, It was well estab- 
lished that, in the case of aJixedtrust for a class ofbeneficiaries, the trustees 
or the court (in the event of the failure on the part of the trustees to execute 
the trust) required a complete list of all the members of the class: otherwise 
the trust could not be executed. The imposition ofthe same "list certainty" 
requirement in the case of discretionary trusts had been confirmed in IRC 
v Broadway Cottages Trust;25 but almost immediately the courts began to 
United Kingdom have to some extent reduced the effectiveness (for that purpose) of large-scale 
discretionaw trusts. 
22 ~e~mith-E$28-~h 915; Re Nelson [I9281 Ch 926; Vest v I R  C (No 2 [I980 AC 1148. 
23 See, for exarnp / e, Re H q ' s  Settlement Trusts [I9821 1 3~ 202,[1981{3 All Ek 7?6 
24 Re Gestetner Settlement 119531 Ch 672 is usually cited as the first reported case InJolving 
consideration of the trus~iow& distinction in the context of such schemes. 
- 
25 119551 Ch 20. The "list certain re uirement as applied to discretionary trusts was formulated 
m Re Ogden [I9331 Ch 678. Z'k Rstetner Settlement, Harman I supported its application 
f: Baden-ty e discretionary trusts: [I9531 Ch 672, 686; but he later expressed regret for the 
absurd anaembarrassing result" stemming from that decision: Re Baden 's Deed Trust [I9681 
2 Ch 388,397. 
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express misgivings2'j and to suggest that discretionary trusts should be 
subject instead to the less strict "criterion certainty" requirement, which 
was applicable to powers.27 In Re Gulbenkian 's Settlements, Lord Upjohn 
expressed his support for the "list certainty" requirement in the case of 
discretionary trustsz8 but in McPhail v Doulton a bare majority of the House 
of Lords rejected that requirement and substituted a "criterion certainty" 
test, "similar" to that formulated for powers of appointment, namely that 
a discretionary trust is valid "if it can be said with certainty that any given 
individual is or is not a member of the   lass''.^^ 
The House of Lords had to deal with two main arguments in favour of 
the stricter "list certainty" requirement. The first argument, that the court, 
if called upon to execute the trust, could do so only by equal division of 
the trust property among all the beneficiaries, has been considered above: 
Lord Wilberforce effectively said that in the context of Baden-type discre- 
tionary trusts the court would never order equal division, or indeed any 
division ofthe trust property that involved giving something to all potential 
beneficiaries. It followed that a complete list of the potential beneficiaries 
would be unnece~sary .~~  According to the second argument, even if not all 
members of the class are to benefit, all members of the class are entitled 
to be considered and for that purpose the trustees still require a complete 
list of the potential benefi~iaries.~' Lord Wilberforce responded:32 
[A] trustee with aduty to distribute, particularly among a very large class, would surely never 
require the preparation of a complete list of names, which anyhow would tell him little that 
he needs to know. He would examine the field by class and category; might indeed make 
diligent and careful inquiries, depending on how much money he had to give away and the 
means at his disposal, as to the composition and needs of particular categories and of 
individuals within them; decide upon certain priorities and proportions, and then select 
individuals according to their needs or qualifications. If he acts in this manner can it really be 
said that he is not carrying out the trust? 
Differences there certainly are between [discretionary trusts] and powers, but as regards 
validity, should they be so great as that in one case complete, or practically complete, 
ascertainment is needed, but not in the other? Such distinction as there is would seem to lie 
in the extent of the survey which the trustee is required to cany out: if he has to distribute the 
whole of a fund's income, he must necessarily make a wider and more systematic survey than 
if his duty is expressed in terms of a power to make grants. But just as, in the case of a power, 
it is possible to underestimate the fiduciary obligation on the trustee to whom it is given,33 so, 
in the case of a [discretionary trust], the danger lies in overstating what the trustee requires to 
know or to inquire into before he can properly execute his trust. The difference may be one 
of degree rather than of principle .... 
See, for example, Re Hain'sSettlement [1961] 1 WLR440,447, [1961] 1 All ER 848, 853 per 
Lord Evershed MR, Re Saxone Shoe Co Ltd's Trust Deed [I9621 1 WLR 943,955-956, [I9621 
2 All ER 904, 914 per Cross J.; Re Gulbenkian's Settlements [I9681 Ch 126, 134 per Lord 
Denning MR. 
The imposition of different requirements to schemes which are intended to achieve essentially 
similar purposes but which are artificially distinguished by constructional niceties produces 
some anomalous results: compare Re Sayer [I9571 Ch 423 and Re Saxone Shoe Co Ltd's Trust 
Deed 1962 1 WLR 943, I19621 2 All ER 904. 
1970 AC 408,524 
1971 AC 424, 456. For the ap lication of the test to the facts of McPhail v Doulton, see Re t I 
Baden's D&d Trusts (No 2) [1873] Ch 9. For a detailed analysis of the requirements as to 
certainty of objects, see Emery (1982) 98 LQR 551. 
It is enerally accepted that a complete list of the beneficiaries is still re uired in the case of 
fixeftrust5 and it is submitted that the same reasoning is equally applicabqe to Burrough-type 
discretionary trusts. 
This seemed to be the view of Lord Upjohn in Re Gulbenkian's Settlements [1970] AC 508, 
524 
19711 AC 424,449. h ee ' below. 
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Since the decision of the House of Lords in McPhail v Doulton, there has 
been a significant shifting of the spotlight, away from the interests of the 
potential beneficiaries in the event of a failure of selection and distribution, 
towards the duties of the trustees during the operational period of discre- 
tionary trusts and powers of appointment and towards the remedies avail- 
able to enforce those duties. This examination of the duties of trustees has 
been prompted both in response to the somewhat inconclusive statement of 
Lord Wilberforce quoted above (and indeed the whole tenor of the decision 
in McPhail v Doulton) and also in response to the increasing incidence of 
powers of appointment conferred on trustees. The practical importance of the 
distinction between Baden-type discretionary trusts and powers of appoint- 
ment now lies in the duties imposed on the trustees of discretionary trusts 
as compared with those imposed on trustee-donees of powers of appointment, 
for example how far they are required to consider the claims of potential 
beneficiaries; and the importance ofthe distinction lies also in the remedies 
available to potential beneficiaries under discretionary trusts as compared 
with those of potential beneficiaries under powers of appointment. 
1. Discretionary trusts 
As suggested above the generic duty of the trustees of discretionary 
trusts is the duty to exercise their discretion. In the case of exhaustive 
discretionary trusts, that duty can only be satisfied by making an exhaus- 
tive distribution; but, in the case of non-exhaustive discretionary trusts, the 
duty may be satisfied by the trustees deciding to accumulate rather than 
distribute income. 
The point is illustrated by Re Locker's Settlement.34 The terms of a 
discretionary trust required the trustees to apply the income for charitable 
purposes or among the class of beneficiaries as the trustees "shall in their 
absolute discretion determine". In response to the expressed wishes of the 
settlor, the trustees did not make any distributions of income from 1965 to 
1968 and they accumulated the undistributed income. In 1975 the question 
arose as to what should be done with that income and, in particular, whether 
the trustees' discretion had expired. Goulding J held that the discretion still 
continued, and that the duty of the trustees to exercise that discretion still 
continued, which, in the context of an exhaustive discretionary trust, 
required the distribution of the accumulated income to persons selected 
from those persons who were members of the class of potential benefici- 
aries in the relevant years.35 
However, in order to carry out that duty of selection, the trustees have 
a prior duty to survey the class. The elaboration of that duty by Lord 
Wilberforce in McPhail v Doulton has been quoted above. Lord Wilber- 
force summarised by referring to the need of trustees "to make such a 
survey of the range of objects or possible beneficiaries as will enable them 
to carry out their fiduciary duty".36 In Re Baden (No 2)37 Sachs LJ referred 
to the comments of Lord Wilberforce and said:38 
34 [I9771 1 WLR 1323, [I9781 1 All ER216. 
35 Ibid at 1325-1326 and 218-219. 
36 119711 AC 424, 457. 
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In modem trusts of the category now under consideration it may be sufficient to know whether 
the range of potential postulants runs into respectively dozens, hundreds, thousands, tens of 
thousands or even hundreds of thousands. ... [The passage from the speech of Lord Wilber- 
force] refers to something quite different to [sic] a need to provide a list of individuals or to 
provide a closely accurate enumeration of the numbers in the class: it relates to that width of 
the field from which beneficiaries may be drawn and which the trustees should have in mind 
so that they can adapt to ittheir methods of discretionary selection. Assessing in a businesslike 
way "the size of the problem" is what the trustees are called on to do. 
And in Re Hay's Settlement Trusts, although the case involved a power 
of appointment, Megarry V-C ventured a "modest degree of amplification 
and exegesis":39 
The trustee must not simply proceed to exercise the power in favour of such of the objects as 
happen to be at hand or claim his attention. He must first consider what persons or classes of 
persons are objects of the power within the definition in the settlement or will. In doing this, 
there is no need to compile a complete list of the objects, or even to make an accurate 
assessment of the number of them: what is needed is an appreciation of the width of the field, 
and thus whether a selection is to be made merely from a dozen or, instead, from thousands 
or millions. ... Only when the trustee has applied his mind to "the size of the problem" should 
he then consider in individual cases whether, in relation to other possible claimants, a 
particular grant is appropriate. 
2. Powers of appointment 
It is now clear that, in identifying the duties of the donees of powers of 
appointment, a distinction must be made between those powers which may 
be termed bare or personal powers and those which may be termed 
fiduciary powers.40 In the first category the donees of powers of appoint- 
ment have no other powers or duties in relation to the property in question: 
for example, a settlor may transfer property to trustees on trust for his 
grandchildren, but he may make the entitlement of the grandchildren under 
the trust subject to a power conferred on his brother to appoint the property 
among a specified class of persons which may or may not include the 
settler's grandchildren. In such circumstances, the donee of the power of 
appointment is an individual who is unfettered by any of the fiduciary 
duties which attach to trustees. It is submitted that, in respect of such bare 
or personal powers of appointment, there is support for following propo- 
sitions: 
(a) As emphasised above, it is in the nature of a power that the donee of 
the power is under no obligation to exercise that power: he has a 
discretion to exercise it, or not, as he chooses. 
(b) Moreover, because the power is conferred on the donee in a personal, 
nonfiduciary capacity, the donee can do with it what he pleases. He 
is under no obligation even to consider periodically whether to 
exercise the power: he can determine simply to ignore it. If he does 
decide to exercise it, he can do so without considering the competing 
claims as between potential beneficiaries of the power, or, in the 
context of the above example, as between, on the one hand, potential 
beneficiaries of the power and, on the other hand, the grandchildren 
who would take the property under the trust if he failed to exercise 
- .  his power. 
39 [I9821 1 WLR 202, 209-210, [I9811 3 All ER 786, 792-793. Megany V-C also ventured to 
correct the punctuation and the syntax of the judgment of Sachs LJ in Re Baden (No 2). 
40 For express recognition of the distinction, see Re Wills ' Trust Deeds [I 9641 Ch 2 19. 
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(c) The only restrictions on the donee appear to be that if he does decide 
to exercise the power, he must keep within the terms of the power 
and only appoint to persons within the specified class of potential 
beneficiarie~.~' 
Until relatively recently, it was asserted that those same propositions 
were equally applicable where the donees of powers of appointment were 
also trustees, for example where trustees of certain property were given a 
power of appointment which was exercisable in respect of the same 
ProPe'.tY. 
The proposition that such trustee-donees might owe any legally enforce- 
able duty to the potential beneficiaries (save that of not appointing to 
persons outside the specified class) received support from Harman J in Re 
Gestetner Sett len~ent,~~ from Cross J in Re Abrahams' Will Trusts43 and 
from Lord Reid in Re Gulbenkian's  settlement^;^^ but in the latter case 
Lord Upjohn twice asserted that donees of powers of appointment, whether 
trustees or not, owe no positive duties to the potential beneficiaries of the 
On the other hand, in McPhail v Doulton, Lord Wilberforce 
characterised as a "complete misdescription" the proposition that the 
duties of trustee-donees were confined to not appointing to persons outside 
the specified class; and he intimated, albeit in somewhat guarded terms, 
that trustee-donees owed the more positive duties of survey and consid- 
e r a t i ~ n . ~ ~  
These positive duties were more fully explained by Templeman J in Re 
Manisty's SettlemenP7 and by Megany V-C in Re Hay's Settlement 
In the latter case, the settlement provided that "the trustees shall 
hold the trust fund on trust for such persons as the trustees shall appoint ... 
and in default of such appointment in trust for the nieces and nephews of 
the settlor. "49 
In circumstances such as these, where the donees of the power are also 
trustees, although the power itself remains merely permissive and discre- 
tionary, so that it does not have to be exercised, the donees of the power 
because they are trustees must act in relation to that power in accordance 
with the fiduciary obligations which are inherent in their trusteeship. The 
obligations arise not from the power but from the office of trustee. 
According to Megany VC, what may appear to be the paradox of 
obligations attached to discretions resolves itself in the following way: 
That brings me to ... the extent of the fiduciary obligations of trustees who have a mere power 
vested in them, and how far the court exercises control over them in relation to that power. 
41 See Re Hay's Settlement Trusts [I9821 1 WLR 202,209, [I9811 3 All ER 786,792. 
42 [I9531 Ch 672,688. 
43 [I9691 1 Ch 463, 474. 
44 [I9701 AC 508, 518. 
45 Ibid at 521 and 524-525. 
46 [I9711 AC 424,449. 
47 [I9741 Ch 17,25-26. 
48 [I9821 1 WLR 202, 209-210, [I9811 3 All ER 786, 792-793. 
49 The wording of that disposition may appear to be somewhat misleading. Under the first part 
property is given to trustees expressly on trust for such persons as the trustees shall select, which 
words seem to suggest a trust. However, the deed goes on to provide that in default of an 
appointment under the first part the property is to be held on trust for the nieces and nephews 
of the settlor. The very existence of that trust in default indicates that the settlor herself 
contemplated the possibility that the trustees might not make an appointment under the first 
part of the deed. Since the settlor contemplated and made provision for such a possibility, it is 
logically inconsistent to say that the first part of the deed created a trust because a trust involves 
a duty to distribute the trust property. Thus the first part of the deed created a discretionary 
power of appointment. 
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In the case of a trust, of course, the trustee is bound to execute it, and, if he does not, the court 
will see to its execution. A mere power is very different. Normally the trustee is not bound to 
exercise it, and the court will not compel him to do so. That, however, does not mean that he 
can simply fold his hands and ignore it, for normally he must from time to time consider 
whether or not to exercise the power, and the court may direct him to do this. 
When he does exercise the power, he must of course (as in the case of all trusts and powers) 
confine himself to what is authorised, and not go beyond it. But that is not the only restriction. 
Whereas a person who is not in a fiduciary position is free to exercise the power in any way 
that he wishes, unhampered by an fiduciary duties, a trustee to whom, as such, a power is 
given is bound by the duties of his office in exercising that power to do so in a responsible 
manner according to its purpose. It is not enough for him to refrain from acting capriciously; 
he must do more. He must "make such a survey of the range of objects or possible 
beneficiaries" as will enable him to cany out his fiduciary duty. He must find out "the 
permissible area of selection and then consider responsibly, in individual cases, whether a 
contemplated beneficiary was within the power and whether, in relation to other possible 
claimants, a particular grant was a p p r ~ p r i a t e " . ~ ~  
... 
How is the duty of making a responsible survey and selection to be carried out in the absence 
of any complete list of objects? This question was considered by the Court of Appeal in Re 
Badetz (No.2). That case was concerned with a discretionary trust and not a mere power; but 
plainly the requirements for a mere power cannot be more stringent than those for a 
discretionary trust.51 
Megarry V-C then ventured his "modest degree of amplification and 
exegesis" quoted above and summarised: 
[Tlhe duties of a trustee which are specific to a mere power seem to be threefold. Apart from 
the obvious duty of obeying the trust instrument, and in particular of making no appointment 
that is not authorised by it, the trustee must, first, consider periodically whether or not he 
should exercise the power; second, consider the range of objects of the power; and third, 
consider the appropriateness of individual appointments. I do not assert that this list is 
exhaustive; but as the authorities stands2 it seems to me to include the essentials .... 
Thus, although the power remains a power and, as such, the trustees 
have no duty to exercise it and cannot be compelled to exercise it, the 
trustees as  trustees nonetheless have duties in relation to the power - in 
particular, a positive duty to consider whether or not to exercise it. 
The status ofthese duties oftrustees in relation to powers of appointment 
were further considered in Turner v Turner,53 where the court declared 
invalid the purported exercise of the power in question. The trustees had 
effectively left all the decision making to the settlor (who was not one of 
the trustees). The court held that they had failed to consider the exercise 
of the power and the appropriateness of the appointments made; and, in 
accordance with the principles laid down by Megarry VC in Re Hay's 
Settlement Trusts, that amounted to a clear breach oftheir duties as trustees. 
It is clear that the intervention of the court was based upon the breach by 
the trustee-donees of their fiduciary duty, and not upon the entitlement of 
(any of) the potential beneficiaries under the power of appointment. 
Nonetheless, in the light of the content of the duties of trustee-donees as 
identified by Megarry V-C, it is arguable that, in the context of large-scale 
fiduciary powers of appointment, it would be difficult for the trustee-donees 
so McPhail v Doulton [1971] AC 424,457, per Lord Wilberforce. 
51 For the duty to survey in the context of aBaden-type discretionary trust, see above. In hfcPhai1 
v Doulton Lord Wilberforce had asserted ([I9711 AC 424, 457) that "a wider and more 
comprehensive range of inquiry is called for in the case of [discretionary trusts] than in the case 
of powers". 
52 The authorities referred to by Megarry V-C included Re Gestetner Settlement [1953] Ch 672, 
Re GulbenkianS Settlements [1970] AC 508, McPhail v Doulton [1971] AC 424 and Re 
Manisty's Settlement [1974] Ch 17. 
53 [I9841 Ch 100. 
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to justify a total failure to distribute any part of the fund. And such a 
conclusion might be reinforced if the potential beneficiaries were afforded 
appropriate remedies to enforce the duties of the trustee-donees. 
IV. DISCRETIONARY T USTS AND POWERS OF APPOINTMENT: 
ENFORCEMENT OF DUTIES OF TRUSTEES 
1. Discretionary trusts 
It is clear that where the trustees of a discretionary trust fail to exercise 
their discretion by selection and di~tribution,~~ and thus fail to perform the 
generic duty inherent in a discretionary trust, the court will ensure its 
performance. 
In the circumstances of Re Locker's Sett len~ent:~~ 
[Wlhere the trustees desire to repair their breach of duty, and to make restitution by doing late 
what they ought to have done early, and they are in no way disabled from doing so, the court 
should ... permit and encourage them to take that course. A tardy distribution at the discretion 
of the trustees is, after all, nearer to prompt distribution at the discretion of the trustees, which 
is what the settlor intended, than tardy distribution at the discretion of someone else. 
However, where the trustees are not willing or able to execute the trust, 
the court will do so. As Lord Wilberforce explained in McPhail v D ~ u l t o n : ~ ~  
[Tlhe court, if called upon to execute the [discretionary trust], will do so in the manner best 
calculated to give effect to the settlor's or testator's intentions. It may do so by appointing 
new trustees, or by authorising or directing representative persons of the classes of benefici- 
aries to prepare a scheme of distribution, or even, should the proper basis for distribution 
appear, by itself directing the trustees so to distribute. 
2. Powers of appointment 
It has always been possible for the potential beneficiaries of a power of 
appointment to apply to the court for an order restraining the donee from 
appointing to a person outside the class of potential benefi~iaries.~' Beyond 
that, on the basis that the donee of a power of appointment was subject to 
no duties (save that of not appointing to persons outside the specified 
class), the distinction between trusts and powers was evident in the 
potential role of the court. To quote Megarry V-C in Re Hay's Settlement 
Trusts:5s 
In the case of a trust, of course, the trustee is bound to execute it, and, if he does not, the court 
will see to its execution. A mere power is very different. Normally the trustee is not bound to 
exercise it, and the court will not compel him to do so. 
On the other hand, in the case of powers of appointment conferred on 
trustees, once it was recognised that the trustee-donees owed duties of 
survey and consideration similar to those owed by the trustees of discre- 
tionary trusts, remedies were required for the enforcement of those duties 
by the potential beneficiaries. In Re Manisty 's Settlement it was asserted 
that "the only right and only remedy'' of the potential beneficiaries was 
the removal of the defaulting trustees and the appointment of replacement 
trustees;59 in Re Hay's Settlement Trusts, Megarry V-C stated that the court 
54 Subject to the powcr of accumulation in the case of a non-exhaustive discretionary trust. 
55 [I9771 1 WLR 1323, 1325, [I9781 1 All ER 216,219. For the facts, see above. 
56 119711 AC 424.457. 
57 See R; ~ulbenkian '~Settlements [I9701 AC 508,525; McPhailv Doulton [I9711 AC 424,456. 
Such a remedy is of course available to the (potential) beneficiaries of all trusts and powers. 
58 [I9821 1 WLR 202,209, [I9811 3 All ER 786,792. 
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might direct the trustees to carry out their dutieQO and, as indicated above, 
in Turner v Turnel.6' the purported exercise of a power of appointment was 
declared void where the trustee-donees had failed to carry out their duties 
in relation to that power. 
Nonetheless there remained a discrepancy between the remedies for the 
enforcement of the duties of the trustees of discretionary trusts and the 
remedies available for the enforcement of the duties of the trustee-donees 
of powers of appointment. It was that discrepancy that came under the 
spotlight in Mettoy Pension Trustees Ltd v Evans.62 Mettoy, a well-known 
British toy manufacturer, had gone into liquidation. Under the much- 
amended rules of the contributory pension scheme established for the 
employees, the trustees of the scheme were required to acquire annuities 
to satisfy the fixed entitlements of the existing and future beneficiaries. In 
the event of any surplus remaining in the pension fund, the rules included 
a power to augment the fixed entitlements of the beneficiaries. That power 
was exerciseable at the absolute discretion of Mettoy itself, not the trustees, 
and any ultimate balance in the fund was to go to Mettoy. After meeting 
the fixed entitlements, there was in fact a surplus in excess of £9 million. 
The trustees issued an originating summons seeking directions from the 
court as to how the surplus fund ought to be administered. The benefici- 
aries clearly wished to establish that they were entitled to the surplus funds 
or at least entitled to have their claim to those funds properly considered. 
Mettoy (or more precisely Mettoy's liquidators) argued that the power to 
augment the fixed entitlements was entirely discretionary and that there 
was no obligation to exercise it; that the power could therefore be released, 
which in turn would activate the gift over in favour of Mettoy; and that the 
surplus funds would then be available for Mettoy's creditors. 
The first task of Warner J was to characterise the discretion in respect 
of the surplus funds. He adopted a fourfold classification of discretionary 
powers: 
(i) a power of appointment conferred on a donee with no obligations in 
relation to that power, save the obligation not to commit a fraud on 
the power by appointing to a person outside the class of potential 
beneficiaries; 
(ii) a power of appointment in;olving fiduciary duties on the part of the 
donee of the power (referred to by Warner J as a "fiduciary power 
in the full sense"63); 
(iii) any discretion which is really a duty to form a judgment as to the 
existence of particular circumstances giving rise to particular conse- 
quences; and 
(iv) a discretionary trust where the trustee has a duty to distribute the trust 
property among the class of potential beneficiaries, although he has 
a discretion to select which of those beneficiaries actually receive the 
property and in what shares. 
Leaving aside category (iii), which has no relevance to the issues under 
consideration, that classification follows the spectrum outlined above. 
59 [I9741 Ch 17, 25, citing Harman J in Re Gestetner Settlement [I9531 Ch 672, 688. 
60 [I9821 1 WLR202, 209, [I9811 3 All ER 786, 792. 
61 [I9841 Ch 100. 
62 [I9901 1 WLR 1587, [I9911 2 All ER513. 
63 [I9901 1 WLR 1587,1613-1614, [I9911 2 All ER513,545, following the terminology ofChitty 
J in Re Somes 118961 1 Ch 250,255. 
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Since the discretion in the present case was clearly not within the fourth 
category, the question was whether the case involved a power of appoint- 
ment within the first or second category. In the words of Warner J:64 
That depends upon whether the words by which that discretion is expressed to be conferred 
on [Mettoy] mean in effect no more than that [Mettoy] is free to make gifts out of property 
of which it is the absolute beneficial owner or whether those words import that [Mettoy] is 
under a duty to the objects of the discretion to consider whether and if so how the discretion 
ought to be exercised. 
Warner J decided that the power was properly classified as belonging 
to category (ii) for two principal reasons. First, its classification within 
category (i) would have rendered any entitlement of the beneficiaries 
illusory and its inclusion within the pension scheme rules would have been 
pointless: since Mettoy was certainly entitled to the surplus in default of 
appointment, the beneficiaries would have been in precisely the same 
position if Mettoy had been absolutely entitled to the surplus.65 Secondly, 
Warner J emphasized that the beneficiaries under the pension scheme were 
not volunteers: by a combination of their contributions to the fund and the 
performance of their contracts of employment they had purchased not only 
their fixed entitlements but also the right to be considered for discretionary 
benefits.66 
However, on the basis of the existing authorities discussed above, the 
finding that the power of appointment was fiduciary appeared to be largely 
academic. Although certain duties owed by trustee-donees had been 
identified, the remedies available for the potential beneficiaries of fiduci- 
ary powers of appointment to secure performance of those duties were 
limited and, in the absence of the appointment of new trustees, were 
apparently confined to a direction to the existing trustees to carry out their 
duties. 
In the circumstances of Mettoy that would have provided an illusory 
remedy for the beneficiaries because the existing trustees were the Mettoy 
liquidators. As trustee-donees of the power of appointment, they would 
have been under a duty to consider exercising the power in favour of the 
beneficiaries; but, as liquidators, they would have owed a duty to Mettoy's 
creditors, which would have required them not to exercise the power of 
appointment with the result that the entitlement of Mettoy in default took 
effect. 
It was in these circumstances that Warner J further assimilated the 
practical operation of discretionary trusts and powers of appointment 
conferred on trustees. He cited the passage from Lord Wilberforce in 
McPhail v D ~ u l t o n : ~ ~  
As to powers, I agree with my noble and learned friend Lord Upjohn in Re Gulbenkian's 
Settlements that although the trustees may, and normally will, be under a fiduciary duty to 
consider whether or in what way they should exercise their power, the court will not normally 
compel its exercise. It will intervene if the trustees exceed their powers, and possibly if they 
64 [I9901 1 WLR 1587, 1614, [I9911 2 All ER 513,546. 
65 [I9901 1 WLR 1587, 1615-1616, [I9911 2 All ER 513, 547. Warner J referred, with obvious 
approval, to Re Courage Group's Pension Schemes ([I9871 1 WLR 495, [I9871 1 All ER 528), 
where the classification of an analogous power within category (ii) precluded a "take-over 
raider" from asset-strip ing the pension fund of the target company. 
66 [1990] 1 WLR 1587, lll8-1620, [I9911 2 All ER 513, 549-551. Warner J disagreed with the 
view ofMillett J in Re Courage Group's PensionSchemes ([I9871 1 WLR495,5 14-5 15, [I9871 
1 All ER 528, 545-546) that any surplus in such pension funds arises from overhnding by the 
emplo er and thus belongs morally to the employer. 
67 [19717Ac 424,457. 
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are proved to have exercised it capriciously. But in the case of a [discretionary trust], if the 
trustees do not exercise it, the court will .... 1 would venture to amplify this by saying that the 
court, if called upon to execute the [discretionary trust], will do so in the manner best 
calculated to give effect to the settlor's or testator's intentions. It may do so by appointing 
new trustees, or by authorising or directing representative persons of the classes of benefici- 
aries to prepare a scheme of distribution, or even, should the proper basis for distribution 
appear, by itself directing the trustees so to distribute. The books give many instances where 
this has been done and I see no reason in principle why they should not do so in the modern 
field of discretionary trusts .... 
Despite the clear distinction that Lord Wilberforce draws between the 
remedies available in the context of powers of appointment and discretion- 
ary trusts respectively, Warner J concluded that all the remedies available 
to the potential beneficiaries in the context of discretionary trusts should 
also be available in the context of fiduciary powers of appointment. In the 
absence of a request for the appointment of new trustees, he took the view 
that he was entitled to approve a proposed scheme or even dictate a scheme 
himself and to that end he invited further argument as to the possible 
content of such a scheme. 
More generally, it is arguably implicit in the approach of Warner J that, 
as tentatively suggested above, the availability of remedies to enforce the 
duties of trustee-donees may lead to a greater incidence of distribution 
among the potential beneficiaries of fiduciary powers of appointment. 
This assimilation in respect of the remedies available in the contexts of 
discretionary trusts and powers of appointment may have further implica- 
tions. It is arguable that this development may also involve assimilation 
between discretionary trusts and powers of appointment in relation to the 
requirements of certainty of objects. In accordance with what has been 
termed the "cardinal p r in~ ip le" ,~~  the objects of a trust or power must be 
sufficiently certain to enable the trustees (or, if necessary, the court) to 
execute the trust in accordance with the settlor's intention. As a result of 
McPhail v Doulton, the same "criterion certainty" requirement for cer- 
tainty of objects applies to both.powers of appointment and Baden-type 
discretionary trusts;69 "list certainty" has never been required for powers 
of appointment and is now no longer required for Baden-type discretionary 
trusts; but discretionary trusts do have to satisfy the additional requirement 
of administrative workability. In the words of Lord Wilberforce in 
McPhail v Doult~n:~O 
There may be a third case where the meaning of the words is clear but the definition of 
beneficiaries is so hopelessly wide as not to form "anything like a class", so that the trust is 
administratively unworkable ... 
Lord Wilberforce suggested, albeit somewhat hesitantly, that a discre- 
tionary trust for "all the residents of Greater London" would be void on 
this ground, but he did not expand on the substance of the requirement of 
administrative ~ o r k a b i l i t y . ~ ~  Moreover, even though the decision in R v 
68 Emery (1982) 98 LQR 55 1 .  
69 Name1 , that it must be possible to say with certainty whether any given individual is or is not 
a memger of the class. 
70 [I9711 AC 424,457. 
71 In Re Hay's Settlement Trusts Megany VC tentatively expressed the view ([I9821 1 WLR 202, 
213, [I9811 3 All ER 786,796) that a discretionary trust for such persons (except a named few) 
82 Canterbury Law Review [Vol. 5, 19921 
District Auditor, ex parte West Yoribhire Metropolitan County Coun- 
ciP2was based on administrative unworkability, that case provides virtu- 
ally no ~larif ication.~~ 
It has been suggested that the notion relates to the practicability of the 
execution of the trustees' duties; and that administrative unworkability 
exists where the settlor has in effect set the trustees an impossible task 
because the class is so defined that there are no discernible criteria 
according to which the selection procedure should be approached. Accord- 
ingly it is argued that the duty apparently imposed on the trustees is in its 
nature incapable of enforcement and control by the courts; and that the 
discretionary trust is therefore void. If this is indeed the substance of 
administrative unworkability, then in the light of the post-McPhail v 
Doulton developments in relation to fiduciary powers of appointment - 
the recognition of the duties of trustee-donees and, more particularly, the 
provision of remedies for the enforcement of those duties - it is arguable 
that administrative unworkability is, in principle, no less a problem for 
fiduciary powers of appointment than for discretionary trusts.74 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Trusts and powers remain conceptually distinct; and in their simplest 
forms - fixed trusts and personal powers of appointment - the impera- 
tiveldiscretionary distinction may also have significant practical impor- 
tance. However, more recently, the greater incidence of trusdpower 
combinations -particularly Baden-type discretionary trusts and fiduciary 
powers of appointment - has led to a dramatic reduction in the practical 
significance of the distinction. First, the requirements as to certainty of 
objects (and thus initial validity) for Baden-type discretionary trusts and 
powers of appointment were assimilated in McPhail v Doulton (except in 
relation to the issue of administrative workability); and it is arguable that 
the decision in Mettoy must inevitably result in complete assimilation. 
Second, although the interests of the potential beneficiaries in the event 
of a failure of selection and distribution remains a point of distinction, 
that distinction has, to some considerable extent, been sidelined by the 
assimilation of the duties of trustees of Baden-type discretionary trusts 
and of trustee-donees of powers of appointment during the operational 
period of the trust or power and by the assimilation of the remedies 
available to enforce those duties. It is submitted that the consequential 
strengthening of the position of potential beneficiaries under fiduciary 
powers of appointment and the reiteration of the position of potential 
beneficiaries under Baden-type discretionary trusts is likely to lead to 
closer continuing scrutiny of trustees throughout the operational period 
as the trustees may select might fail on the same ground, although he too failed to offer any real 
explanation for that view. See McKay [I9741 Conveyancer 269 for a detailed but predictably 
inconclusive analysis of the notion of administrative unworkability. 
72 [I9861 26 RVR 24; and see Harpum (1986) 45 CLJ 391. 
73 Lloyd LJ asserted that a trust with 2.5 million potential beneficiaries "is quite simply 
unworkable. The class is far too large". However, the case was heard under the Crown Office 
List, the point was not fully argued and the relevant authorities were not hlly considered. 
74 Prior to the post-McPhailv Doulton developments, in Blausten v I R  C ([I9721 Ch 256) Buckley 
LJ assumed obiter that the notion of administrative unworkability did apply to powers of 
appointment, while in Re Manisty 's Settlement ([I9741 Ch 17) Templeman J questioned that 
conclusion. In Re Hay's Settlement Trusts ([I9821 1 WLR 202, [I9811 3 All ER 786) Megany 
V-C preferred the latter view. Even if administrative unworkability could invalidate a fiduciary 
power of appointment, since it did not invalidate the discretionary trust in McPhail v Doulton, 
it is suggested that it would not have posed problems on the facts of Mettoy. 
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of the trust or power; and it has been suggested that that in turn may 
significantly reduce the incidence of disputes over the entitlement to funds 
at the end of the operational period. If there is indeed a reduction in the 
incidence of such disputes, which arguably provide the only remaining 
context for the application of the strict conceptual trust/power dichotomy, 
then it may be possible to assert that the courts have acknowledged and 
addressed the artificial distinction between Baden-type discretionary trusts 
and fiduciary powers of appointment -a distinction which, according to 
Lord W i l b e r f ~ r c e , ~ ~  has probably never commended itself to laymen or 
logicians. 
75 McPhail v Doulton [I9711 AC 424,448. 
